The rationale for a BCA
• Increased political pressure for some form of border carbon adjustment (BCA) to complement stringent climate policy
• This would level the playing field between domestic producers and foreign producers who experience little, or no constraint on their GHG emissions.
• Arguments that justify such a trade measure generally refer to competitiveness concerns and/or carbon leakage. The BCA, a trade measure
• A BCA is a trade measure: It may be contested by a member of the World Trade Organization .
• Recent legal literature concluded that, under some conditions, such a BCA may be WTO-compatible.
-Depends on its design ...
-and the way of implementing it.
-WTO-compatibility imposes constraints to define a BCA.
• At the same time, the design of a BCA impacts its performances in terms of carbon leakage mitigation.
Objectives
• Not to reach conclusions on the opportunities for implementing an EU border adjustment • but (to try) to identify the BCA that would be compatible with WTO rules -or at least can increase the chances of it being so. • And to propose a quantitative analysis of the BCAs identified -in particular, assessment of their efficiency in limiting carbon leakage -as well as their impact on the production and market shares of European firms.
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• Definition of a BCA
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• Results
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What is a BCA? How to define a BCA?
• Definition of a border adjustment to an ETS -allocation mode: auctioning/free allocation.
-form of the BCA: price-based or allowance-based -coverage of the BCA:
• imports /imports and exports;
• direct emissions /direct and indirect emissions -adjustment base: EU or foreign average specific emissions, best available technology emissions -the targeted products -the targeted countries
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The legality of a BCA
• Two options -the compatibility with the GATT general regime -the legality with the environmental exception rule, Article XX -Each option refers to different requirements.
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The general regime of the GATT
• Not imposing a heavier burden on imported products than on domestic products
• Not advantaging domestic producers when they export.
• Most-favoured nation principle (Article I) : No exemption of a group of countries
• The design envisaged -allocation mode: auctioning;
-form of the BA: allowance-based;
-coverage of the BA: imports and exports; only direct emissions;
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• The designs envisaged -Adjustment base:
• Crucial to impose a similar treatment (or at least not less favorable) to foreign firms.
• Use of Best Available Technology (BAT) for BA on importations -Similar treatment or at least a more favourable treatment of imported than European products -Determination of a world BAT problematic -Use of the product-specific benchmarks set in the EU ETS -If a particular exporting firm whose unitary emissions is lower than the EU benchmark can prove that its emissions are lower than the reference value, then it must be allowed to use this value.
• Average EU specific emissions for exports.
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Article XX
• General exception provisions of Article XX -Article XX allows trade restrictions to "protect human, animal or plant life or health" (Art. XX (b)) -or to ensure "the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" (Art.
XX (g)) -It cannot be invoked to offset competitive disadvantages for domestic industry
• No really elements of designs but rather indicators to examine -Real contribution to its environmental goal
• World emissions, even more than carbon leakage -Acceptance determined by the balance between its contribution to climate protection and its trade restrictiveness
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• Implementation way of the measure is important for the legality -Country should have made all efforts to reach an international agreement -Initiative in negotiating with countries that might be affected by the BA. -The BA should take into account the efforts of trading partners to abate GHG emissions and this may result in lower (or no) BA on imports from countries having measures comparable in effectiveness.
• Possible exemption of a group of countries
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• What to retain for our modelling?
-Firstly, demonstrating the environmental benefits of the BA is crucial.
• World emissions -Secondly, there is no clear conclusion concerning the legality of the export BA and about the adjustment base to use. -Lastly, examining the trade restrictiveness (or "disguised restriction")
• Evolution of the market shares of European firms as an indicator for demonstrating that the BA does not have trade-restricting objectives.
• The design envisaged -allocation mode: auctioning; -form of the BA: allowance-based; -coverage of the BA: only imports; only direct emissions; -Adjustment based on the European benchmarks for imports. The public revenues
• Implementation of auctioning and BCA could allow generating a significant amount of public revenues -Around €25 and €30 billion in 2020 -The revenues due to the BCA are small (between 0.2 and 2 billion in 2020)
• A part could be used for climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in developing countries.
-It could facilitate an international agreement on climate change -...and demonstrate the "good faith" of the EU. The performance to limit carbon leakage and/or world emissions
• Leakage-to-reduction ratio at least halved by border adjustments.
-Importance to include the exportations in the BCA .
• GATT's general regime and Article XX exceptions are not equivalent.
-A little more efficient when the BCA is based on allowance rather than on price
• Concerning the world emissions -Biggest reductions when the BCA is based on allowance -Inclusion of an export part is less important.
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• What is the objective of a BCA?
-Competitiveness loss and carbon leakage often considered like the two sides of the same coin -Could one instrument, here a BCA, contribute both to carbon leakage limitation and to competitiveness preservation? -In fact, it depends on which you call "competitiveness". 
Market shares of the EU firms
Conclusion
• A BCA, an interesting option to limit carbon leakage (competitiveness channel).
• And maybe a necessary option if regions want to continue to move ahead with climate policy -Increasing the stringency of the objective -implementing auctioning
• … and preventing the problems posed by the free allocation (risk of distorting the carbon price signal, lobbying, windfall profits,…)
• Generating significant public revenues
• Preserving the signal price
• But implementing a BCA must be made with care. 
Cement sector
• Cement may be imported as a finished product, or imported clinker may be milled and blended into cement at the point of arrival
• Representation of the substitution between clinker (the CO2-intensive intermediate product) and CO2-free substitutes (e.g. fly ashes or blast furnace slag) as well as the substitution between domestic and imported clinker.
• Market share of imported clinker in the EU and the clinker ratio (the share of clinker in cement) modeled through nested logit functions 
